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ABSTRACT
Presented herein are techniques that use multiple neural networks and segmentation
of the traffic to detect the presence of applications or business processes within a noisy
mixture of network traffic. In addition, the techniques presented herein provide a novel
way to detect unusual, bad intentioned, and/or malicious activity, which is also a “process”,
using recurrent and convolutional neural networks. The learning outcome can potentially
identify compromised network infrastructure devices and/or telemetry collectors.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Data is being generated at high volumes, at high velocities, and with veracity by
many different devices, applications, things, processes, etc. Conventional approaches to
analysis of data typically involves collection of the data from the sources using different
collectors and then storing the data into centralized repositories. In some cases, data may
be tagged or labeled indicating the source (e.g., device or process of origin). However,
more often data is not labeled (for various reasons); and subsequently, the relationship
between the data and its source (process or thing) is not obvious. Similarly, sequences from
multiple processes are lost in the mix of large repositories full of untagged data. In addition,
cyber attackers are using techniques for attacking modern applications and "end-to-end
processes."
As described further below, the techniques presented herein propose automated and
smart methods for analyzing data within telemetry collectors to glean knowledge about the
underlying "processes" and application interactions. By learning about the underlying
process, it is possible to create a model the describes the "end-to-end process" behavior.
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This information, in turn, allows the system to recognize bad intentioned and/or malicious
activity from future data streams.
Applications, Devices, Things or Processes (collectively and generally referred to
herein as “processes”) generate sequential data streams (e.g., network flows) in high
volume. Data Collectors aggregate such sequences of data from multiple source processes
into a single repository. In numerous cases, data streams are stored in a repository in a
"blended" form or with a random mixture of multiple data sequences. In addition, in many
cases, the elements of the data sequences are not tagged or labeled by the name of the
source process generating the telemetry data stream. For example, processes can use the
same symbols when generating telemetry data.
The proposed techniques automatically detect the presence of the known
“processes” in a random mixture of "unlabeled" data sequences. For example, as shown
below in Figure 1, three processes each generate specific sequence of symbols.

Figure 1
In addition, as shown below in Figure 2, the flow collector captures “network and/or
data flows” and saves the flows into a repository as an interlaced mixture in much less clear
form.

Figure 2
As shown, each symbol does not carry any information about the source process
(i.e., the process from which the symbol was originated). Therefore, as shown below in
Figure 3, the collector stores the data from Processes A, B, and C as an unlabeled sequential
mixture of symbols.

Figure 3
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Figure 4, below, illustrates an application/business Process use case to detect te
presence of the "Business Processes/Applications" in network flow data.

Figure 4
In

Figure

4,

the

symbol

"SMBLTJUK"

represents

conversation

"152.15.40.215|52.21.9.111|443" (src, dst, dst_port), and it can be part of the traffic from
different applications or business process.
Once each of "Business Processes/Applications" are detected and categorized,
unusual, bad intent, and malicious activity could be identified using recurrent and
convolutional neural networks. In addition, a similar approach can be taken to identify any
potential malicious activity against a network infrastructure and/or telemetry collection
device (e.g., if the network infrastructure device or collector is compromised).
Figure 5, below, is an overview diagram illustrating aspects of the techniques
presented herein.

Figure 5
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Aspects of the techniques presented herein will be described below with reference
to four (4) general steps, namely: (1) Learning and Modeling Processes, (2) Generation of
Training Data, (3) Building a Classification Model, and (4) Detection.
Step 1: Learning and Modeling Processes
As the name suggests, during the learning phase, multiple streams of data sequences
are collected and aggregated by one or multiple independent collectors into a central place,
as shown below in Figure 6.

Figure 6
At this step, each process is discovered and modeled as a Stochastic Markov
process. Each process is described by its flows transitioning matrix and flows
distribution, as shown below in Figure 7.

Figure 7
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Step 2: Generation of Training Data Using
In the second step, training data is generated using the process models from Step 1,
above. For each process, training data may be generated using a 50/50 proportion of
"Process"/"Non-Process." A transitional matrix may be used for each discovered process
to generate 5,000 training data sequences (samples) of the "process" (Traffic). It may be
possible to generate 5,000 total training samples from other processes, in order to keep
50/50 ratio of process/non-process.
These aspects may also include data augmentation to mix each sample with random
noise (10-20%). In on example, a permutation could be repeated ten (10) times. In the end
there will be 50,000 samples of the "process" and 50,000 samples of "Non-Process" for
each process (e.g., repeat the above to generate a test data set for each process). For
example, if there are ten (10) discovered processes, there will be 10 Training Data sets and
10 Test Data Sets. Each Training data set will have 100,000 samples in proportion 50/50
of "Process"/"Non-Process"
Step 3: Building a Classification Model
In the third step, a classification model is built using shallow Neural Networks
(CONV1D or Simple RNN) and the data from step 2, above (i.e., train classification models
for each process). Each classification model will classify only one process and provide a
binary result of whether this is a process or not (One against-all). As a classification model,
the techniques presented can use a simple recurrent neural network as well as
Convolutional 1D models, although more complex recurrent neural networks such as GRU
or LSTM may not produce better results than simple networks.
An example of a CONV 1D Network may be represented as:
model = keras_model_sequential() %>%
layer_embedding(input_dim = max_codes, output_dim = 64, name =
"EMBEDDING") %>%
layer_conv_1d(filters = 4, name = "CONV1D‐1", kernel_size = 7,
activation = "relu") %>%
layer_global_max_pooling_1d() %>% # this layer flattens 3D to 2D
layer_dropout(0.5) %>%
layer_dense(units = 1, activation = "sigmoid", name = "OUTPUT")
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An example of a simple RNN network may be represented as:
model = keras_model_sequential(name = "MODEL_RNN") %>%
layer_embedding(input_dim = max_codes, output_dim = 64, name =
"EMBEDDING") %>%
layer_simple_rnn(units = 128, name = "RNN‐1",
dropout = 0.1, recurrent_dropout = 0.1,
return_sequences = FALSE) %>%
layer_dense(units = 1, activation = "sigmoid", name = "OUTPUT")
An example of a compile and train phase may be represented as:
compile(
model,
optimizer = "rmsprop",
loss = "binary_crossentropy",
metrics = c("acc")
)
history = fit(
model,
train_set, train_labels,
epochs = 10,
batch_size = 128,
validation_split = 0.2,
callbacks = list(early_stop),
shuffle = TRUE
)
Step 4: Detection
A challenge with the use of neural network for the classification is that a neural
network is trained using samples of the desired Class and samples of Non-Class. If the
classification model is to recognize a Process "Cat,” then the model was presented
thousands of variations of this "Cat" (e.g., in one example, samples or "pictures" of traffic
from the process "Cat" mixed with some noise). A second model designed to recognize
only the process "Dog" is trained in a similar manner using thousands of variations of the
process "Dog.” If the "Cat" model is presented traffic or "pictures" from process "Cat,”
then they can be perfectly recognized as "Cat,” with the same result with the "Dog" model
and process.
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Moreover, even if pictures with "dog" and "cat" are presented next to each other,
each model will be able to recognize what it has been trained to recognize (e.g., Model
"Dog" will recognize "Dog", and Model "Cat" will recognize "Cat"). However, a problem
arises from the fact that the real-life "pictures" of traffic are random mixtures/blends or
double/triple/quadruple/etc. exposures of "dogs" and "cats", because collectors can mix the
traffic. Such a mixed "picture" is neither a "dog" nor a "cat". Therefore neither of the
models can recognize such mixed images. Figure 8, below, illustrates examples of this
image analogy (e.g., Cat + Dog = Neither Dog Nor Cat) which are on-recognizable by any
model.

Figure 8
To address this issued, the techniques presented herein carved the "picture" of the
traffic into multiple overlapping segments using a moving window of relatively small size
and then attempt to classify each segment separately. These small classifications can then
be combined as a vote. The main idea behind this is that, if an image or sequence as a whole
is recognizable as "dog", then the combination of classifications of multiple segments

7
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020

5950X
8

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 2927 [2020]

should also be recognizable as "dog". This idea has been verified and confirmed using
CONV1D and Simple Recurrent Neural Networks. Therefore, when there is a mixture,
the system will try to classify each segment using the classification models, and then
aggregate. The combined result will give us a distribution of what Signals/Processes where
detected or recognized. This is shown below in Figure 9.

Figure 9
When a mixture of sequences of processes A and B are presented, Classifier A will
detect Process A in 50% of segments, and Classifier B will detect Process B in 50% of
segments. Each segment is classified as A or B with 70-80% guarantee. In the end the
detection mechanism will provide an answer that there are two Processes in this traffic,
namely A and B, as shown below in Figure 10.

Figure 10
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The following provides a series of detailed steps for the proposed solution:
#1 : Segment traffic sequence with overlapping segments, using moving window of
W_len size and stride(shift) == 1.
#2 : Classify each segment by each RNN_Model or CONV1D_Model
p[3,2] : probability of Classifying Segment2 as Process3 by Neural Network RNN_Model3
Seg1 Seg2 Seg3 Seg4 Seg5 Seg6 Seg7 Seg8 Seg9
Process1 p[1,1] p[1,2]
0.45
0.745
p[1,9]
Process2 p[2,1] p[2,2]
0.8
0.75
p[2,9]
Process3 p[3,1] p[3,2]
0.81
0.3
p[3,9]
Process4 p[4,1] p[4,2]
0.47
0.56
p[4,9]
#3 : Apply credibility level threshold 0.75 (Configurable)
C_level = 0.75
If p[i,j] <= C_level then p[i,j] = 0 , then want the Classification Model to have
high level of confidence.
Seg1 Seg2 Seg3 Seg4 Seg5 Seg6 Seg7 Seg8 Seg9
Process1 p[1,1] p[1,2]
0
p[1,9]
0
Process2 p[2,1] p[2,2]
0.8
p[2,9]
0
Process3 p[3,1] p[3,2]
0.81
p[3,9]
0
Process4 p[4,1] p[4,2]
p[4,9]
0
0
#4 : Calculate ARGMAX, which process gives the highest probability to each
segment
If ALL probabilities are Zero, then assign Zero to argmax.
Seg1 Seg2 Seg3 Seg4 Seg5 Seg6 Seg7 Seg8 Seg9
Process1
p[1,1] p[1,2]
0
0
p[1,9]
Process2
p[2,1] p[2,2]
0.8
0
p[2,9]
Process3
p[3,1] p[3,2]
0.81
0
p[3,9]
Process4
p[4,1] p[4,2]
0
0
p[4,9]
argmax(seg) p[4,1] p[4,2]
3
0
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#5 : Mark <UNKNOWN> or undetectable segments
If argmax(i) == 0 then Seg[i] == <UNKN>
Hypothetical argmax(i):
Seg1 Seg2 Seg3 Seg4 Seg5 Seg6 Seg7
Seg8 Seg9
Process1
p[1,1] p[1,2]
0
0
p[1,9]
Process2
p[2,1] p[2,2]
0.8
0
p[2,9]
Process3
p[3,1] p[3,2]
0.81
0
p[3,9]
Process4
p[4,1] p[4,2]
0
0
p[4,9]
argmax(seg) 2
2
3
3
2
3
1
<UNKN> 3
#6 : Calculate distribution of detectible processes
Using argmax(seg):
2 2 3 3 2 3 <UNKN> 3 1
Calculate distribution of classification outcomes:
1
2
3
<UNKN>
0.1111111 0.3333333 0.4444444 0.1111111
#7 : Make conclusion(s)
Excluding <UNKN> segments, conclude :
1. Top One Process : Process 3
2. Top Two Processes : Process 3 and 2
3. There is trace of presence of Process 1, but it is too small to be considered.
4. Process 4 is not detected at all.
It is highly probable that data is generated by the Processes 2 and 3 out of four possible
processes. By performing these classification outcomes, unusual processes, bad intentions,
and malicious activity could also be detected. If these learning methodologies are applied,
they could also be used to verify and perform attestation of abnormal behavior in network
infrastructure devices and collectors (in the case that a network infrastructure device or
telemetry collector is potentially compromised).
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